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The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between ownership 
evolution, innovation activities and firms performance using firm-level 
data on 60 privatised enterprises in Macedonia for the period 2001-2010. 
To examine the nature of this relationship we will develop a model 
relating the determinants of ownership and performance and apply it to 
the original dataset collected by the author. Specifically, the investigation 
will respond to several questions such as the impact of ownership 
structure and innovation activities undertaken by firms, competition from 
other firms, sector, location, age, size and other firm characteristics on 
the firm performance. The main contribution of this empirical work is 
reflected in the application of new and advanced econometric techniques 
such as two-step GMM kernel and enhanced CUE (GMM) estimations to 
the analysis of changes in performance resulting from the change in 
ownership in Macedonia. By investigating this relationship we provide 
sufficient evidence to support the view of significant ownership-
performance relationship of privatised firms in Macedonia. 




1.  INTRODUCTION  
In all transition economies, the transfer of ownership to the private 
sector resulted in an initial dispersion of ownership amongst a large number of 
new owners, followed by a gradual concentration of ownership and a change in 
the type of dominant owner. The privatisation process was expected to change the 
incentive structure of the privatised firms, alter the behaviour of the management, 
make the firms more dynamic, and eventually lead to an improvement in their 
performance. The aim of this study is to explore thprocess of evolution of 
ownership structure and its impact on the performance of firms in Macedonia. 
Many studies investigating the relationship between ownership change 
and firm performance have already been published. Three major surveys, 
Megginson and Netter (2001), Djankov and Murrel (200 ) and Estrin et al. 
(2009), have reviewed most of these studies. Megginson and Netter (2001) assess 
the overall impact of privatisation in the transition and non-transition economies. 
Djankov and Murrel (2002) review over one hundred academic studies to sum up 
the experiences of the TEs of Central and Eastern Eu ope in the decade of 1990s. 
Estrin et al. (2009) evaluate the effects of privatisation in TEs and China, using 
additional studies not covered in the previous surveys.  
The empirical literature on ownership-performance relationship covers 
two main dimensions of ownership change: concentration of ownership and the 
type of the dominant owner emerging in the post-privatisation period. The 
question of whether or not concentrated ownership is more conducive to 
performance improvement than dispersed ownership has received much attention 
in the ownership-performance literature. However, a consensus has not been 
reached over the nature of the relation yet. As for the type of dominant owner, 
there is also much discussion as to what type of dominant owner (government, 
insider owners, domestic outsider owners or foreign ow ers) will be more able to 
engage in restructuring measures and improve the performance of firms.  
One of the benefits expected from the privatisation processes is its 
fundamental role in establishing new set of organiztional dynamics that promote 
innovation and a change in production technology. The novelty of this study is 
that it extends ownership structure-firm performance models by incorporating the 
innovation behaviour of firms.  
In the area of ownership-performance relationship te literature has 
generated surprisingly diverse findings and many results are questionable because 
of the failure of some researchers to control adequately for endogeneity of 
ownership and the selection bias. The issue of the endogeneity of ownership 
structure was raised by Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who point 
out that the owners of a firm adjust their ownership of shares according to the 
performance and other characteristics of the firm. As pointed by Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001), studies that have failed to take endogeneity into consideration 
produce biased estimation. Therefore, the more recent literature on this 
relationship have been addressing these issues (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; 
Hashi and Shehaj, 2007). Furthermore, the theoretical and empirical evidence 
indicates that firms were not chosen to participate in the privatisation process at 
random. In TEs some firms were privatised earlier than others. This fact raises the 
issue of the selection of the firms to be privatised. Therefore, in studying the 
effects of privatisation, potential selection bias brought about by strategic 
sequencing needs to be understood and controlled for. 
To examine the nature of this relationship we will develop a model 
relating the determinants of ownership and performance and apply it to the 
dataset of 60 firms over a ten year period. Specifically, the investigation will 
respond to several questions such as the impact of ownership structure and 
innovation activities undertaken by firms, competition from other firms, sector, 
location, age, size and other firm characteristics on the firm performance. The 
main contribution of this empirical work is reflectd in the application of new and 
advanced econometric techniques such as two-step GMM kernel and enhanced 
CUE (GMM) estimations to the analysis of changes in performance resulting 
from the change in ownership in Macedonia, something which has not been 
applied before.  
By investigating this relationship we provide evidenc  to support the 
presence of a significant ownership-performance relationship in privatised firms 
in Macedonia. The results also indicate that in Macedonia the ownership 
structure, be it diffused or concentrated, is impacted by innovation activities, 
nationality of owners, and other firm characteristic . Furthermore, being 
concerned with the impact of innovation activities on ownership structure and 
firm productivity our results indicate that the innovation activities undertaken by 
firms after privatisation are significant factors. 
The study is structured as follows. The next section discusses the model 
specification and the measurement of the variables involved. Section 3 provides a 
statistical overview of the overall sample. Section 4 presents a statistical overview 
of the data on the evolution of ownership. The empirical results are elaborated in 
Section 5, first by providing empirical estimations of determinants of ownership 
and then continuing with their impact on firm performance. Section 6 summarises 
the findings and concludes. 
 
2. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND THE MEASUREMENT 
OF VARIABLES 
The investigation of the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance is based on two models (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001): (i) we 
estimate how ownership structure is affected by firm characteristics, including 
firm performance; and (ii) we investigate the extent to which the performance of 
firms is influenced by ownership structure. The general models to be estimated 
can be written in the following form: 
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Subscripts i and t refer to the company and year respectively, while 
subscript j indicates the j-th exogeneous variable in the two equations. Ownership 
structure shows the percentage of shares of a company owned by the largest 
shareholder; performance is indicated by either labour productivity or net profit 
margin. X represents a vector of firm characteristics such as innovation activities, 
size, age, industry, restructuring activities, etc.
The first model supposes that firm performance and other firm 
characteristics would influence ownership concentration. Better performing firms 
would experience more concentrated ownership, since owners (or potential 
owners) would want to acquire more shares in order to take control of the firm. 
The second model considers the effect of ownership concentration and other firm 
characteristics on firm performance. The relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance is based on the hypothesis that large 
shareholders will help increase the profitability of the firm by closer monitoring 
and the amelioration of the agency problem. Despite much research in the field, 
the question remains whether large owners contribute to the solution of agency 
problem- or exacerbate it- in different environments.  
The main concern in the literature is the cost of the separation of 
ownership and control, or the agency cost. Empirical studies investigating this 
relationship focus on the advantages of ownership concentration, but they do not 
provide consistent results (Claessens and Djankov, 1999; Hanousek, Kocenda and 
Svejnar, 2007; Grosfeld and Hashi, 2007; and Balsmeier and Czarnitzki, 2010, 
among others). Dispersed ownership in large firms increases the principal-agent 
problem due to asymmetric information and uncertainty while ownership 
concentration is expected to improve firm performance due to increased 
monitoring by owners and the consequent improvement in the quality of 
managerial decision. On the other hand, Grosfeld and Hashi (2001) have pointed 
out that high concentration may also have a negative effect on firm performance 
because of: (i) its excessive control and restraining mpact on managerial 
initiative; (ii) the lower levels of stock liquidity associated with high 
concentration that weakens the informational role of the stock market; and (iii) 
ownership concentration is costly for the large share olders because it limits risk 
diversification. 
The measurement and the variables employed in the model, namely firm 
performance, ownership structure, innovation activities and other control 
variables are discussed in detail in the following sub-sections.  
 
 
2.1. Firm performance measures  
The empirical work in this field of research (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Grosfeld and Hashi, 
2001; Jones et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006; Hashi nd Shehaj, 2007) uses a wide 
range of measures to quantify the firm performance. G nerally, in the empirical 
studies two different measures of firm performance ar employed: (i) market 
measures, such as Tobin’s Q, and (ii) accounting measur s, such as return on 
assets, return on equity, return on sales, etc. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
highlight the difference between these two measures in two respects, as shown in 
Table 1. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) employ accounting profit rate to measure firm 
performance (the post-tax accounting profit-to-book value of equity). 
Table 1 The difference between accounting measures and Tobin’s Q 
 Time perspective Who  measures the performance 
Accounting profit rate Backward looking Accountants 
Tobin’s Q Forward looking Investors 
 
The choice of a performance indicator in the TE litera ure mainly 
depends on the availability of the data. The fact that not many companies are 
listed on the stock exchanges of TEs makes the use of Tobin’s Q as a measure of 
performance almost impossible. It has therefore been necessary for most studies 
to employ accounting measures. Other studies have used labour productivity as 
an indicator of economic performance.  
For the empirical investigation of the ownership-performance 
relationship in Macedonia, we follow this literature and employ two performance 
indicators based on the firms’ balance sheets for the years 2001-2010, i.e., (i) 
labour productivity as the sales to number of employees ratio and (ii) net profit 
margin as the net profit to sales ratio. Further, from the balance sheets we create 
variables such as total assets to number of employees, labour cost to sales, 
percentage of capital to total assets, etc. which we use as other firm 
characteristics (section 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables). 
 
2.2. Ownership structure variables  
As with firm performance, a wide range of measures of ownership 
structure have also been applied in the literature. Most of studies investigation the 
issue follow Demsetz and Lehn (1985), by using the percentage of shares owned 
by the largest 5 or 20 shareholders and a HHI-type ind x. Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) use fraction of shares owned by the management and the fraction of shares 
owned by the largest shareholding interest, arguing that using both of them gives 
a more accurate picture of the complexity of interests represented by a given 
ownership structure.  
Grosfeld and Hashi (2001) focus on two dimensions of ownership 
structure, the concentration of ownership (measured by the share of the largest 
shareholder) and the type of dominant owner (other companies, investment funds, 
individuals, portfolio companies, banks and the state). A recent study, Hanousek 
et al. (2011), proposes several ownership concentration categories by defining 
different types of majority and minority groups. This is the approach used in the 
present study. The first category is the absolute dominance type, with the largest 
owner owning more than 50 percent and others owning less than 10 percent, i.e. 
no other significant owners. The second category reflects a monitored dominant 
owner in which there is a dominant owner (owning more than 50 percent of 
shares) but there are also other significant owners (owning at least 10 percent of 
shares), thus large enough to be able to exercise som monitoring of the dominant 
owner. The third category is a ‘jointly controlling minority’ category, where two 
or three minority owners together own more than 50 percent of shares. The last 
category, dispersed ownership, represents a situation in which none of the 
shareholders owns more than 10 percent of shares. 
Three different dimensions of the evolution of ownership will be 
employed for the investigation of ownership structure in this study: (i) 
concentration of ownership measured as the share of the largest shareholder and 
the share of the three largest shareholders; (ii) the presence or absence of a 
dominant owner, comprising of the four specific ownership concentration 
categories identified in the previous paragraph -  absolute dominance, monitored 
dominance, jointly controlling minority and dispersd ownership; and (iii) the 
type of dominant owner indicating whether the owner is ethnic Macedonian, 
ethnic Albanian or foreign.  
 
2.3. Measures of innovation activities and other variables  
A variety of measures of innovation activities have b en used in the 
literature - research and development (R&D) spending, the number of patents, the 
number of new products introduced in a year, the percentage of sales resulting 
from the new products, to name a few. Following Schumpeter’s definition of 
innovation (1939, p. 84), we employ new product andnew process generated by 
firms, as in Love et al. (1996), Chudnovsky et al. (2006), Griffith et al. (2006), 
Commander and Svejnar (2007), Falk (2008) and Ghosh (2009). This information 
is extracted from the SPEM 2001-10, the response to a question on whether the 
firm had introduced a new, or significantly improved, product, service or process 
after privatisation. 
Several other variables are used to measure the relationship between 
ownership structure, innovation activities and firm performance. Specifically, 
these are the control variables consisting of firm characteristics such as firm size, 
age, year of privatisation, industry group, restructuring index, the volatility of 
firms’ environment, and the founder/manager’s education level and gender. 
We measure firm size by the number of employees of the firms as 
responded in the questionnaire. Firms’ age is measur d by the number of years 
the firm has been in operation. In the questionnaire the respondents were asked to 
indicate the year when the company started its operation. By subtracting the year 
of the establishment from the current year in panel w  get the variable as an 
indicator of the firm’s age. Similarly, we generate the variable of years since 
privatisation. This would enable us to examine the effect of the time since 
privatisation.  
Another variable that might have an impact on the concentration of 
ownership and its firm performance is the technological intensity of the industry 
in which a firm is operating. We follow the Eurostat definition for the 
classification of components of the manufacturing idustry on the basis of their 
technological intensity (using NACE Rev. 2 at 2-digit level as the basis of 
classification), grouping different activities into high-technology, medium high-
technology, medium low-technology and low-technology industries. Similarly 
Eurostat classifies the service sector as knowledge-intensive services (KIS) or as 
less knowledge-intensive services (LKIS).  
A firm’s restructuring activities is another variable that has an impact on 
its performance, and potentially on its ownership structure (restructured firms are 
more desirable to own). The enterprise survey (SPEM 2001-2010) contained 
several questions on restructuring activities of firms in areas such as product 
innovation, assets, staff, finance and management undertaken after privatisation. 
These questions were qualitative questions and the respondents were asked to 
rank them on a scale from zero to five. Given the multidimensional nature of the 
restructuring process, the factor analysis technique (‘factor’ command in STATA 
11) was used to combine the answers to these questions and generate the 
‘restructuring index’ variable which is used as one of the variables in the 
regression analysis.  
 
3. STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF THE SAMPLE  
For the empirical analysis of this study we employ primary firm-level 
panel data for 60 privatised firms in Macedonian for the period 2001-2010. The 
panel dataset of 60 firms in ten years consists of tw  types of variables, i) time-
invariant – the questionnaire variables and ii) time-variant – the financial 
statements of the firms and their ownership evolutin in ten years.  
The descriptive statistics of the financial data and the relationship 
between the firm performance indicators and different firm characteristics are 
presented in Table 2 which provides an overview of the development of the 
financial variables through years.  
 
 
Table 2 Average values of the financial variables for the sample, 2001-10 
Year  Labour 
Productivity (in 






Leverage Total Assets 
Turnover (Sales to 
Total Asset) 
2001 Average 2.6 -3.1 2.9 .89 
2002 Average 2.9 1.0 5.3 .86 
2003 Average 3.0 -9.4 11.4 .81 
2004 Average 3.0 -6.6 15.3 .82 
2005 Average 3.6 -9.6 18.1 1.09 
2006 Average 4.9 -9.3 12.1 .84 
2007 Average 4.6 -285.0 13.2 .92 
2008 Average 5.6 -23.6 34.6 .79 
2009 Average 4.5 -34.8 16.7 .79 
2010 Average 4.9 -65.4 83.7 .90 
2001-
2010 
Average 4.0 -62.4 21.4 .88 
No of 
obs 
563a 567 568 506 




Labour productivity has been increasing over time with the highest point 
reached in 2008. The average of net profit margin remains negative through the 
years of analysis. The leverage ratio has also increased over time. 
The following figures present some cross tabulations of firm 
characteristics and how they are related to firm performance. Figure 1 shows the 
relationship between the innovation activities of firms in different technological 
classifications and their labour productivity. 
 
  
Figure 1 Labour productivity and innovativeness by technological 
intensity of firms (in million denar per worker) 
Firms in the group of high-technology manufacturing or high knowledge 
intensive services seem to perform better than other firms. Also, innovative firms 
seem to be performing better than non-innovative firms across the sample. 
Interestingly, there are no non-innovative firms in the high-technology and high-
tech KIS industry. Figure 2 presents the average labour productivity of sample 
firms for firms of different size, innovativeness and ownership concentration.  




























Figure 2 Firms’ performance and innovativeness by size and type of 
ownership concentration (in million denar per worker) 
 
As it can be noticed, larger firms tend to have higher concentration 
(absolute dominance) and perform better than small and medium size firms. 
Further, all the firms that have introduced new products and/or processes after 
privatisation tend to have more concentrated ownership and perform better than 
non-innovative firms. Generally we notice that better performing are large firms 
that have undertaken innovation activities, and this is the case irrespective of 
whether the firm has an absolute dominance structure or not. In the next section 
we continue with the statistical overview of the evolution of ownership structure. 
Two different dimensions of the process of evolution of ownership are analysed: 
(i) concentration of ownership and (ii) the type of the dominant owners.  
 
4. EVOLUTION OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE: 
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW 
In this section we provide the descriptive statistics of the dynamics of 
the ownership data, i.e. the evolution of ownership concentration, five different 
ownership concentration categories, and different types of ownership structure. 
Further, the relationship between ownership structue and the other variables of 
our analysis such as firm performance, innovation activities, and other firm 












characteristics are also explored. Table 3 shows the percentage share of all large 
shareholders owning more than 5% of shares. Data is provided for the seven 
largest shareholders.  
Table 3 Average holding of largest shareholders holding more than 5% 
of shares 





















2001 Mean 50.6 16.1 9.3 7.3 5.8 5.7 5.4 
 No of 
companies 
46a 22 8 4 3 3 2 
2003 Mean 54.9 20.7 11.1 6.4 5.6 5.2 5.1 
 No of 
companies 
53 27 10 4 2 2 1 
2004 Mean 55.8 21.4 11.2 6.4 5.6 5.3 0 
 No of 
companies 
55 28 10 4 2 2 0 
2005 Mean 54.9 21.0 11.6 6.3 5.5 5.1 0 
 No of 
companies 
59 31 12 6 1 1 0 
2006 Mean 55.8 19.7 11.9 6.8 5.9 5.1 0 
 No of 
companies 
59 35 17 8 5 1 0 
2007 Mean 56.9 18.6 11.5 8.1 6.2 5.1 0 
 No of 
companies 
59 33 19 10 7 1 0 
2008 Mean 56.3 18.7 11.8 8.2 6.4 5.5 0 
 No of 
companies 
58 34 21 11 7 2 0 
2009 Mean 57.2 18.7 12.0 8.5 6.4 5.5 0 
 No of 
companies 
58 34 20 10 7 2 0 
2010 Mean 57.3 18.8 11.7 8.3 6.6 5.5 0 
 No of 
companies 




Mean 55.6 19.4 11.5 7.6 6.2 5.4 5.3 
No of 
companies 
505 280 137 68 40 16 3 
a The number of companies in the ’Largest Owner’ column gives the number of observations and it 
differs from the size of the sample because of the missing data. The 2002 ownership data is also 
missing. 
 
One can observe that at the beginning of the period (year 2001) the 
average percentage of shares owned by the single lar st owner was already quite 
large (50.6) and it has increased over time (to 57.3), thus indicating that the 
ownership of firms has become more concentrated through time. Further, with the 
exception of 2001 and 2003 where there were companies with 7th largest owners 
holding more than 5% of shares, the great majority of companies from 2004 
onwards did not even have a seventh owner with 5% of shares in the company, 
meaning that the number of shareholders with more than a 5% stake in companies 
has reduced. 
It is important to mention here that there are no firms in which there is a 
combined ethnic Macedonian and Albanian owners in the sample. There are few 
cases with monitored minority or dispersed ownership meaning that ethnic 
Albanian firms have evolved faster to more concentrated ownership compared to 
ethnic Macedonian firms. However this is the case only for a small number of 
firms since out of the overall privatised firms only a dozens of them have ethnic 
Albanian ownership (there might be a few more cases where they own less than 
5% of shares). Figure 3 presents the average labour pr ductivity as performance 
indicators for different types of ownership and their innovating activities.  
 
Figure 3 Average labour productivity by type of dominant ownership 
and innovativeness, 2001-2010 (in million denar per wo ker) 
It can be noticed that foreign innovative firms have better performance 
than all other firms. In general firms that undertake innovation activities in all 
ownership types perform better than those which have not undertaken any 
innovation activities irrespective of the nationality of dominant owners. 
Innovative firms under ethnic Macedonian ownership perform better than firms 
under ethnic Albanian ownership.  











Overall, the statistics suggest that better performing firms are large firms 
which belong to high-technology or KIS sector, and have undertaken innovation 
activities after privatisation. Considering ownership concentration, foreign owned 
firms in the absolute dominance category perform better than other ethnic 
ownership groups and other concentration categories.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We are now going to investigate the two models specified in section 2 
(equations (1) and (2) empirically. Firstly, the two dimensions of the evolution of 
ownership: (i) concentration of ownership and (ii) the type of the dominant 
owners are estimated. Secondly, the extent to which t e performance of firms is 
influenced by ownership structure, innovation activities and other firm 
characteristics are explored.    
The early literature on the ownership-performance rlationship 
employed OLS method of estimation and thus resulted in biased estimates 
because of the assumption of exogeneity (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Grosfeld and Hashi, 2003). Following 
Wintoki et al. (2010) we are going to control for three potential sources of 
endogeneity which are highlighted in the literature, namely (i) unobserved 
heterogeneity, (ii) simultaneity and (iii) dynamic endogeneity, which need to be 
taken into account.  
In order to compare the improvements gained from the enhanced 
techniques of the IV/GMM we first estimate the models with pooled OLS method 
as the baseline analysis. To deal with the endogeneity of labour productivity and 
the share of the largest owner, we will use instrumental variables (IV), by finding 
instruments which satisfy the two key assumptions (i) the instrumental variable 
must be uncorrelated with the error term but (ii) must be correlated with the 
independent variable. The instruments considered ar the natural logarithm of 
depreciation as proxy for capital input and managers age as proxy for the quality 
of management. Both appear to be valid instruments a d satisfy the test of 
redundancy. We further continue with the enhanced routines for IV/GMM 
estimation presented by Baum et al. (2007) which produce statistics that are 
robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, such as GMM 
kernel and the GMM continuously updated estimator (CUE) of Hansen et al. 
(1996), applied to panel specification.   
The empirical results of the estimated models are presented on table 4 
and 5. Firstly, we estimate the effect of the determinants of ownership 
concentration using the share of the largest owner (LogC1) as dependent variable. 
Second, we investigate the impact of ownership concentration, innovation 
activities and other firm characteristics on firm performance, with labour 
productivity as a measure of performance.  
Table 4 provides the results from three different estimation techniques  
of the share of the largest owner (LC1)  on firms performance variable, labour 
productivity (LNLP) , Innovation activities (INNOV), nationality and ethnicity of 
the dominant shareholder (Dommac and FRGN), type of ownership 
(INDIVIDUAL), firm size (size), firm age (LNAGE), capital intensity (LNCI), 
the leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), the volatility of firm’s environment (StROA), 
years since privatisation (YsinceP), restructuring i dex (RI) and technological 
intensity category of the firm’s industry (HighTech, MedHTech, MedLTech, 
HTKIS).  
Firm performance may determine the shareholders’ decision to increase 
or decrease their shareholding in a company. One ca expect that shareholders 
might be more interested in increasing their holdings in firms that are not 
performing well in order to have more control on the management and obtain 
some of the benefits of control by improving the firm’s performance. But on the 
other hand risk-averse shareholders might look for risk diversification and thus 
reduce their holdings in poorly performing firms. The impact of firm performance 
on shareholders’ decision to concentrate their holdings is therefore ambiguous. 
However in the transition context, having in mind the high level of uncertainty 
and poor legal protection, shareholders are more lik ly to increase their 
shareholding in better performing firms. The results, using different techniques, 
are similar - indicating a positive and significant performance-ownership 
relationship. This means that better performing privatised firm in Macedonia tend 
to have more concentrated ownership.  
  
Table 4 Determinants of ownership concentration in different models 
Model IV/2SLS 2 step-GMM kernel CUE estimation  
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: The share of the largest owner (LC1) 
LNLP 1.00*** (0.167) 1.01*** (0.296) 1.01*** (0.174) 
INNOV -1.32*** (0.247) -1.33*** (0.407) -1.33*** (0.259) 
Dommac -1.37*** (0.231) -1.38*** (0.406) -1.38*** (0.207) 
FRGN -0.58 (0.362) -0.58 (0.613) -0.59* (0.319) 
INDIVIDUAL -0.92*** (0.162) -0.92*** (0.281) -0.93*** (0.155) 
size 2.89*** (0.635) 2.87*** (1.068) 2.89*** (0.649) 
size2 -0.76*** (0.154) -0.75*** (0.273) -0.76*** (0.160) 
LNAGE -21.33***(2.141) -21.35*** (4.050) -21.44*** (2.226) 
LNAGE2 2.95*** (0.294) 2.96*** (0.572) 2.97*** (0.312) 
LNCI -4.23*** (1.541) -4.12 (2.848) -4.18** (1.764) 
LNCI2 0.15*** (0.053) 0.15 (0.099) 0.15** (0.062) 
LEVERAGE 0.02 (0.123) 0.02 (0.167) 0.01 (0.102) 
StROA -0.01 (0.121) -0.01 (0.111) -0.01 (0.118) 
YsinceP 0.00 (0.015) 0.00 (0.029) -0.00 (0.017) 
RI 0.52*** (0.086) 0.52*** (0.171) 0.52*** (0.088) 
HighTech -4.01*** (0.456) -4.01*** (0.754) -4.00*** (0.390) 
MedHTech -1.01*** (0.359) -1.00* (0.560) -1.00*** (0.315) 
MedLtech -0.62*** (0.237) -0.63 (0.478) -0.63** (0.256) 
HTKIS -2.09*** (0.601) -2.08*** (0.773) -2.09*** (0.434) 
Instruments:    
LNdep √ √ √ 
ManAGE √ √ √ 
Observations 393 393 393 
R-squared 0.476 0.475 0.476 
Adjusted R-squared 0.449 0.448 0.439 
F statistic 20.59 10.36 22.28 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
66.28 18.19 45.02 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Shareholders’ interest in increasing or decreasing their holdings may 
also vary among innovative and non-innovative firms. The introduction of new 
product and/or process is usually considered as risky, due to the possibility of the 
failure of the innovation (the product not accepted in the market, high costs, etc.) 
which makes innovation less attractive for risk-averse shareholders. On the other 
hand, such high levels of risk are also coupled with h gh potential returns, which 
make innovative firms particularly attractive for shareholders to increase their 
holdings. In other words the impact of innovation activities on shareholders 
decision to concentrate their shares is ambiguous. The regression results show 
negative and significant coefficient for innovation activities when using share of 
the largest shareholder as the dependent variable. This means that innovative 
firms are more likely to decrease the level of concentration of ownership. Owners 
might find these firms in Macedonia as more risky and thus reduce their shares. 
When the share of the three largest shareholders is employed as dependent 
variable innovation activities have significant negative coefficient, thus the same 
applies regardless which variable is used.   
The level of ownership concentration may depend on different types of 
largest shareholder (Grosfeld and Hashi, 2004). Corporation may have more 
incentives to concentrate their shares as compared with individuals. The ethnicity 
and nationality of the dominant owners is another important factor that may affect 
ownership concentration. The first two models (IV/2SLS and two-step GMM-
kernel) show insignificant coefficients for foreign owners (indicating that the 
foreign ownership concentration is the same as withAlbanian owners but higher 
than Macedonian owners. However, foreign ownership ap ears to be negative and 
only marginally significant when applying the CUE estimations, indicating that 
we have sufficient evidence to say that foreign owned firms tend to be less 
concentrated than domestic Albanian firms. The impact of the dominant ethnic 
Macedonian ownership is negative and significant in all three different 
estimations, which implies that it is smaller than the impact of dominant Albanian 
owners (the base category). These results indicate th  ethnic Macedonian owned 
firms tend to be less concentrated than the ones with dominant ethnic Albanian 
ownership. The individual variable has a negative and significant coefficient thus 
we can conclude that individuals have fewer incentives to concentrate their shares 
than companies.  
Another determinant of ownership concentration is firm size. Larger 
firms are less likely to be highly concentrated because of wealth limitation and 
risk aversion. It is more costly to acquire large portions of equity in larger 
companies, and shareholders are more interested to diversify their shares thus 
would not prefer to invest large fraction of their wealth in one firm. Nevertheless, 
in the uncertain environment of TEs, large and older firms are perceived by 
shareholders as more stable and better known thus they may be interested in 
increasing their shareholdings in these firms. The impact of firm size on the 
ownership concentration is thus ambiguous. 
The three techniques result in positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for firms’ size. The squared value with negative sign shows that the 
increase is non-linear i.e. there is  an inverse U-shaped relation between the two. 
This is in accordance with our expectations that in an uncertain environment such 
as in Macedonia large firms are perceived as more stable and better known, thus 
the shareholders are more interested to increase their s ares (but of course only 
up to a point, after which they would decrease their oldings). 
The effect of leverage on ownership concentration may be ambiguous. 
High leveraged firms are more risky thus risk-averse owners may wish to avoid 
increasing their shareholding in them (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). On the other 
hand, firm leverage may also be considered a compleentary monitoring 
mechanism (as it can induce monitoring by lenders) and in this sense the 
shareholders may increase the level of ownership concentration. The three 
estimation techniques result in insignificant coefficient thus we have insufficient 
evidence to confirm that firm leverage has any effect on shareholdings in the 
company. Furthermore, the two other control variables, firm volatility and years 
since privatisation are insignificant. We have insufficient evidence to confirm that 
firms that have been privatised at the beginning of privatisation process tend to 
have more concentrated ownership than those privatised more recently.  
We control for the technological intensity of the industry to which the 
firm belongs. High-technology firms are more likely to be less concentrated 
because of risk aversion. High-technology, high-technology KIS, medium-high-
technology and medium-low-technology firms show to have negative and 
significant signs, meaning that they tend to have less concentrated ownership 
compared to low-technology and low-technology KIS firms.  
We now continue with the second model. The variables employed are 
the same as in the previous model (1), but in this specification we examine the 
impact of ownership structure (share of the largest shareholder LC1) and other 
firm characteristics on firm performance. The results of the regression analysis 
generated from three different methods (IV, GMM kernel and CUE GMM) are 
presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 Determinants of firm performance in different models 
Model IV/2SLS 2 step-GMM 
kernel 
CUE estimation 
LC1 0.99***(0.165) 0.99***(0.292) 1.35***(0.259) 
INNOV 1.31***(0.199) 1.32***(0.375) 1.48***(0.295) 
Dommac 1.37***(0.291) 1.37** 1.20***(0.376) 
FRGN 0.57(0.351) 0.58(0.634) 0.91*(0.484) 
INDIVIDUAL 0.92***(0.186) 0.91***(0.353) 0.92***(0.256) 
Size -2.87***(0.661) -2.85***(1.000) -4.80***(0.845) 
size2 0.75***(0.162) 0.75***(0.248) 1.27***(0.211) 
LNAGE 21.19***(3.169) 21.15***(5.438) 24.92***(4.593) 
LNAGE2 -2.93***(0.428) -2.93***(0.740) -3.38***(0.613) 
LNCI 4.20***(1.414) 4.09(2.654) 3.25*(1.975) 
LNCI2 -0.15***(0.050) -0.14(0.094) -0.12*(0.070) 
LEVERAGE -0.02(0.123) -0.02(0.169) -0.11(0.141) 
StROA 0.01(0.120) 0.01(0.108) -0.09(0.152) 
YsinceP -0.00(0.015) -0.00(0.029) -0.01(0.021) 
RI -0.51***(0.121) -0.51***(0.194) -0.32*(0.109) 
HighTech 3.99***(0.637) 3.97***(0.987) 4.08***(0.710) 
MedHTech 1.00**(0.440) 0.99(0.691) 1.33**(0.525) 
MedLtech 0.62***(0.208) 0.62(0.383) 0.14(0.247) 
HTKIS 2.07***(0.650) 2.06**(0.869) 1.79***(0.606) 
    
Observations 393 393 417 
R-squared 0.067 0.071 -0.821 
r2_a 0.0190 0.0240 -0.903 
r2c 0.0666 0.0713 -0.821 
F 15.94 9.128 13.74 
df_m 19 19 18 
Widstat 19.94 5.963 14.64 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We find consistent results across the three estimation echniques 
reported in Table 5. They all show that performance is statistically dependent on 
ownership structure and type of ownership. The three estimation techniques are 
consistent with previous studies that show significant effect of ownership 
structure on firm performance.  
The table shows a positive and significant relationship between 
innovation activities and labour productivity. This  suggesting that when 
accounting for endogeneity in the regressors, together with HAC standard errors, 
the relationship between innovation activities and firm performance does not 
change. In accordance to our expectations more innovative firms tend to perform 
better than the non-innovative ones. 
The variable Dommac, i.e., dominant ethnic Macedonian ownership, is 
positive and significant for the three estimation techniques. Foreign ownership 
appears to be significant only when the CUE estimations are applied. When the 
CUE estimation technique is applied, the positive significant sign for dominant 
ethnic Macedonian owners and Foreign owners, indicate that these firms perform 
better than dominant Albanian owned firms (dummy base category).   
All the three estimation techniques show negative and significant 
coefficient for the variable firm size, indicating that as firms get smaller their 
performance improves. The positive sign of the size quared variable indicates 
that there is a U shaped non-linear relationship.  
Capital intensity is another control variable that s been used in the 
performance equation (Himmelberg, et al., 1999). The results show positive and 
significant coefficient with the IV/2SLS and CUE estimation techniques, but 
insignificant with the two-step GMM technique. The r lationship becomes 
negative significant for the squared term (again insig ificant for two-step GMM) 
though with smaller coefficient meaning that capital intensity increase will 
improve labour productivity up to a point, beyond which it will cause a decrease 
in productivity. 
The firm leverage is insignificant in all the estimations. Thus, we have 
insufficient evidence to conclude that leverage affects firm performance. The 
same situation is found for the volatility variable and years since privatisation. 
Furthermore, CUE estimates result in positive and significant coefficients for the 
manufacturing and service industry based on technological and knowledge 
intensity. This indicates that high-technology firms and knowledge intensive 
services perform better than low-technological and k owledge intensity activities.  
 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS   
This study investigated (i) the main determinants of ownership structure 
and (ii) the impact of ownership structure on the firm’s performance in privatised 
firms in Macedonia. The statistical overview of the overall sample shows that 
ownership concentration has increased over time and that more concentrated, 
large and innovative, firms perform better.   
For the empirical analysis three different estimation techniques are 
applied to the dataset of 60 firms over a 10 year period in Macedonia in order to 
deal with endogeneity, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems. We treat 
both ownership concentration and performance as endogeneous variables. The 
first estimation findings support the view that the firm productivity significantly 
affects ownership concentration (two-step GMM estima ons appears to have 
insignificant coefficient). Other variables such as innovation activities, nationality 
or ethnicity of the dominant owner (ethic Macedonian, ethnic Albanian orforeign 
ownership), type of ownership (individuals or companies), size, years since 
privatisation and the technological intensity of the industry in which the firms 
operate have significant impact on ownership structure. 
With the second investigation, the impact of ownership structure on firm 
performance, we provide evidence that ownership structu e has a statistically 
significant impact on firm performance. Further, the results indicate that 
innovation activities, firm size and restructuring are the main factors (significant 
in the three estimation techniques) that influence the productivity of privatised 
firms.  
Finally, some important findings can be identified from the empirical 
results. Firstly, the results of the regressions differ slightly depending on the 
model used, but there is sufficient evidence to support the significant positive 
ownership-performance relationship. Secondly, being concerned with the 
ownership structure and the impact of innovation activities on firm productivity 
we are able to conclude that the innovation activities undertaken by firms after 
privatisation are significant factors. Finally, the r lation between ownership 
structure and labour productivity in Macedonia is also related to the ethnicity of 
the dominant owners indicating that ethnic Albanian firms tend to be more 
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